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III.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings
Ms. King (hereinafter “King”) accepts the appellant’s nature of the case and course
of proceedings as correct.
Statement of Facts
While the state’s recitation of the facts is by and large correct, it fails to address all
of the relevant testimony by Patrol Sergeant Lathrop (hereinafter “Lathrop”). Lathrop
testified on direct examination that the vehicle crossed three intersections (2nd, 3rd, and 4th)
and then made a legal turn on 5th street (Tr. p.6, Ls 11-21). However, when cross examined,
inconsistencies in that testimony arose. On cross, Lathrop testified that he wrote a report
in this case, that the stop itself is an important part of his report to get accurate, and that
when he wrote the report he believed he included all relevant information as to why the
traffic stop was performed. (Tr. p.8, L. 16 - p.9, L. 9). When questioned, Lathrop testified
that he wrote in his report that the vehicle did not make a turn at 3rd or 4th Avenue, and
eventually made a turn at 5th Avenue. (Tr. p.9, Ls 10-19). Lathrop never tried to contradict
his report that only gave 3rd and 4th Avenue as streets that the car passed through with its
blinker on. It is because of the cross examination testimony that the Magistrate’s findings
of fact were that King “had her blinker on through at least two intersections and then turned
on the third intersection.” (Tr. p.20, L. 20 – p.21, L. 19).
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IV.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review

The Standard of Review in the present case was enunciated in State v. Kelley,
Docket No. 43392, Filed June 16, 2016:
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App.
1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786,
789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
Legal Argument
A.

The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
There are three (3) types of contacts between law enforcement and private
individuals, including (1) consensual encounters which are not a seizure and no
justification is required; (2) stop/investigative detention justified by reasonable suspicion;
and (3) actual arrests justified by probable cause. State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912
P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 839 P.2d 1237 (Ct. App.
1992); and State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 815 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991).
Whenever an officer stops an individual and restrains his or her freedom, even
2

momentarily, that person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and
therefore, the stop and detention must comply with the constitutional standards of
reasonableness. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968); Matter of Clayton, 113
Idaho 817, 819, 748 P.2d 401 (1988); and State v. Waldie, 126 864, 893 P.2d 811 (Ct.App.
1995). The stop and detention of a suspect is justifiable under the Fourth Amendment only
if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the
suspect has been engaged in, is engaged in, or is about to engage in criminal activity.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (1975); State v. Benefiel,
131 Idaho 226, 953 P.2d 976 (1998); and State v. Manthei, 130 Idaho 237, 939 P.2d 556
(1997). The stop must be based on more than mere speculation, inarticulate hunches or
instinct. See Terry; State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 953 P.2d 645 (Ct.App. 1998); and
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d 522, 525 (Ct.App. 1991). Reasonable
suspicion requires more than “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.” Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415 (1990) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)). The Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that
“[w]hether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of
the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” State v. Bishop,
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980,
983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.App.2003); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18,
101 S.Ct. 690, 694-96 (1981)).
Ordinary and routine traffic stops are a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and therefore, the stop must be based on reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the vehicle is being driven in violation of the traffic laws or that the vehicle or an occupant
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has been engageding in or is about to engage in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391
(1979); and State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 973 P.2d 758 (1999).
It is well established law that an individual has a reasonable or legitimate
expectation of privacy where there is a subjective expectation of privacy in the area
searched or seized and society is willing to accept the subjective expectation of
privacy. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577 (1979); Katz v. United States,
289 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); and State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859, 893 P.2d 806
(Ct.App. 1995). Generally the driver of a vehicle has standing to contest the
reasonableness of an investigatory stop as well as the continued detention. State v.
Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 679 P.2d 1123 (1984).
Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable and in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Thus if it is established that the warrantless search or seizure
infringed on an individual's legitimate privacy interest, the state must show that the search
or seizure fell within the delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971); and State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 900 P.2d 196 (1995). Evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
must be suppressed, as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
34 S.Ct. 341 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961); and State v.
Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927). In summary, the evidence acquired as a result of
a constitutionally impermissible search or seizure must be excluded unless the causal
connection between the seizure and the acquisition has been broken. Wong Sun v. United
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States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407 (1963); and State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 787
P.2d 231 (1990).
1) There Was Not Sufficient Reasonable Suspicion to Believe King Was Driving
Under the Influence
Lathrop had insufficient facts to constitute reasonable suspicion of DUI. The only
facts available to the officer at the time he pulled King over were that she was driving late
at night, that she went through “at least two intersections” with her turn signal on, and that
she made a legal turn in the direction she was indicating by her turn signal. The test for
reasonable suspicion “is fact specific and focuses on the totality of the circumstances.”
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991). In State v. Emory, the
Court of Appeals reviewed the basis for reasonable suspicion to stop an individual who
was eventually charged with DUI, and created a test to determine if a driving pattern gives
rise to reasonable suspicion of intoxication.
In Emory, the officer who initiated the stop on the defendant stated that the factors
that led to his reasonable suspicion were: “the slowness of Emory’s response to the traffic
signal; the closeness of Emory’s vehicle to other vehicles parked on the street; and the fact
that it was 2:40 a.m. on a Sunday morning.” Id. at 663. Similar to the case at hand, the
Court of Appeals in Emory maintained that those factors did not give authority to stop
because they did not indicate Emory had violated any law nor was engaged in criminal
activity. Id. The Court of Appeals found that the officer lacked the objective facts at the
time he stopped Emory to infer that Emory was engaged in criminal activity. Specifically,
the Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he evidence adduced by the officer could just as easily
be explained as conduct falling within the broad range of what can be described as normal
driving behavior.” Id. at 664. The Court stated that while the officer believed that the
5

delayed response of the driver could be caused by driving under the influence based on his
training, “such inferences must still be evaluated against the backdrop of everyday driving
experience.” Id. The Court of Appeals accepted that being preoccupied or distracted was
plausible explanation for why Emory paused after the light turned green. Further, the Court
stated in reference to the early hour that “the fact that the stop occurred in the early morning
hours does not enhance the suspicious nature of the observation.” Id. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the officer’s observations did not give rise to “reasonable and articulable
suspicion that Emory was driving his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.” While
the Court stated that it became apparent later that Emory was intoxicated, it also stated that
“the suspicion of the stop must be based upon objective information available to the officer
when he decided to make the stop.” Id.
In King’s case, the primary reason the officer pulled her over was due to his belief
that she was driving under the influence based on the time of night for the stop and her turn
signal being on through at least two intersections before turning at the third. In State v.
Emory, the Court of Appeals stated that the stop in that case occurring in the early morning
hours did not enhance the suspicious nature of the observations. Thus, the time of night
should not weigh heavily towards there being reasonable suspicion in King’s case. This
would leave the turn signal staying on through multiple intersections as the primary basis
for reasonable suspicion. Just as was the case for the Defendant in State v. Emory, King
did not break any driving laws based on the objective observations of the officer at the
time, and her driving should be evaluated against the same “backdrop of everyday driving
experience” as the Court of Appeals looked at in Emory. Id. If the Court was unable to find
enough for reasonable articulable suspicion in Emory, it should not find sufficient
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reasonable suspicion to pull over King.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently upheld the Emory test to determine if a driving
pattern may provide reasonable suspicion of intoxication in State v. Neal. 159 Idaho 439,
443, 362 P.3d 514, 518 (2015) (citing Emory, 119 Idaho at 664, 809 P.2d at 525).
Specifically “whether the driving pattern falls outside ‘the broad range of what can be
described as normal driving behavior.’” Id. In that case, Neal drove twice onto the line
marking the right side of his lane, near midnight. Id. The Supreme Court held that
“[w]ithout more, the two instances of moving onto the fog line are not sufficient to arouse
reasonable suspicion of DUI under Idaho precedent” and that “two instances of driving
onto the fog line do not create a driving pattern that justifies an investigatory stop of the
vehicle for suspicion of DUI. Id. at 443-444. The officer’s basis for the stop in Emory is
similar to Lathrop’s basis for the stop of King in the present case. In both instances, the
officer pulled the vehicle over for a perceived driving pattern that was not otherwise an
infraction and not directly in violation of any Idaho code section. No other negative driving
pattern or law violation is given in either case. Lathrop never specifically stated why his
training and experience made him believe that a person driving through intersections was
likely driving under the influence. In fact, Lathrop testified under oath to what amounted
to a hunch, which would mean it was not connected to any specific knowledge he would
have in 16 years of being an officer. Therefore there is no evidence upon which an objective
observer could have relied to indicate that her behavior violated the law, or that her driving
was impaired in any manner. Instead, it can be more readily explained as within the norm
of everyday driving behavior.
The District Court did not, as is suggested, apply the incorrect legal standard to this
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case. As noted in Neal, the two justifications of a traffic stop are either reasonable suspicion
that the driver committed an offense (usually a traffic offense) or the officer had reasonable
suspicion of other criminal activity, like driving under the influence. Neal, 159 Idaho at
442, 361 P.3d at 517. As stated above, the test for whether a driving pattern provides
reasonable suspicion for a DUI is whether the driving falls into the broad range of normal
driving behavior. Id. at 443. In this case, the driving pattern did not provide reasonable
suspicion of driving under the influence because it was found to be in the pattern of normal
driving behavior. Thus, under the facts of this case the only legal basis to pull King over
would have been some other “illegal driving pattern” as referenced by the district court.
There is a suggestion that Lathrop’s 16 years of experience gives greater weight to
his “hunch” that King was driving under the influence. The first issue with this proposition
is that the officer gave nothing specific about his training or anything he had learned in 16
years that gave teeth to his hunch that King was under the influence. The observed driving
pattern nor his years of experience were never specifically tied together, and when asked
for the basis of his stop, the officer stated “my suspicion was she could have possibly been
DUI or something because of the fact that she was going through intersections and not
turning like her turn signal indicated.” (Tr. p.12, Ls 7-13) (emphasis added). In short, the
officer’s suspicion of “DUI or something” fits the definition of “inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion,” and reasonable suspicion to stop must be greater than that.
White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 S.Ct. at 2415 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)).
The brief for the state relies on a number of cases, the first that it cites to is the
decision in State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).
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The case at hand is distinguishable from the case at hand. That case also looked at the same
test from Emory for reasonable suspicion i.e., did the driving fall within the broad range of
what can be described normal driving behavior. Id. (citing Emory, 119 Idaho at 664, 809
P.2d at 525). The vehicle in that case touched the lines on the edge of its lane three times,
and the Court found that that sort of behavior was not in the pattern of normal driving
behavior and was an objective indication of the driver’s impairment. The behavior of
drifting, touching a lane line, and then swerving and over-correcting to the other side of
the lane is classic behavior of intoxicated drivers. There is no real innocent explanation for
this sort of swerving back and forth. On the other hand, in King’s case, the behavior of
leaving one’s turn signal on can just as easily be explained as the driver not knowing which
street to turn onto. Further, this explanation is supported by the fact that the car turned in
the direction the turn signal indicated. By contrast, drivers swerving and drifting constantly
back and forth in their lane is accepted to be an indicator the driver is impaired. King’s
driving was entirely within the realm of normal driving behavior; she was not speeding or
committing any other traffic offense, and for all intents and purposes, the only suspicious
thing about her driving to the officer was the turn signal staying on which could just as
easily mean she was being a careful driver. These cases demonstrate very different driving
patterns. And it is correct that no traffic offense was specifically committed in Atkinson.
However, that does not mean that the standard for reasonable suspicion for a driving pattern
on a DUI is so low that any observable driving pattern that is not “perfect” is reasonable
suspicion.
Another case cited by the state is State v. Flowers, and that case is also
distinguishable from the present case. 131 Idaho 205, 953 P.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1998). In

9

Flowers, the same test of the driving pattern was used as Emory, Atkinson, and Neal. Id.
Similar to Atkinson, the driver in Flowers was hugging the fog line, and then weaved in its
own lane before crossing the fog line and then contacting the center line of the road once
or twice. Additionally, he was driving 10 miles per hour below the speed limit. Again, this
pattern of driving has much more objective indicators of impaired driving than in King’s
case. The driver is swerving back and forth, overcorrecting, and driving below the speed
limit enough that it was noticeable to the officer. Furthermore the driver in Flowers was
failing to maintain his lane of travel, and the officer could at least point to multiple factors
that indicated impairment. This sort of driving pattern is far beyond the driving pattern by
King; the officer in Flowers is seeing a vehicle hugging a lane line, swerving in its lane,
going below the speed limit, and potentially crossing the center lane line versus King
driving in a perfectly normal fashion beyond the turn signal being on for a longer than
necessary period of time. The Atkinson and Flowers cases highlight a stark contrast to the
driving pattern by King, and in fact both seem to support that King’s behavior fell into the
pattern of normal driving behavior.
The state also cites to Wilson v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 136 Idaho 270, 276, 32 P.3d
164, 170 (Ct. App. 2001). The basis for the stop in Wilson v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t is not
applicable to King’s case and explicitly is irrelevant to the basis for the stop in the present
case. 136 Idaho at 276, 32 P.3d at 170. In Wilson, the officers knew based on a call that the
individual driving the car had just left a residence where he had been drinking and was
impaired. Id. The officer had a tip from an identified individual (rather than an anonymous
tip that may not have the same indicia of reliability) that the person driving the car that was
stopped had in fact been drinking prior to driving and was in fact “definitely drunk.” Id.

10

At the same time, as in King’s case, the officer did not observe any traffic violations
himself. No such tip existed in King’s case of an identified individual claiming that King
was in fact driving the car while impaired. While Wilson does stand for the proposition that
there does not have to be any driving pattern or traffic violation to have reasonable
suspicion to stop an individual for driving under the influence, the facts are not applicable
to King’s case. Absent facts that there was a tip about King driving while impaired, the
basis for the stop in Wilson does not apply to the basis for the stop in King’s case
whatsoever.
Yet another case relied upon by the state is State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 100, 15
P.3d 334, 335 (Ct. App. 2000). This case is clearly distinguishable from the present case
because in Larson a woman called the police due to a man who appeared to be drunk
knocking on her door. Id. at 100, 15 P.3d at 335. After the officer arrived at the scene, the
reporting party informed dispatch that the suspect had left the scene in a GMC pickup with
a shell. Id. The officer then viewed a GMC pickup with a shell leaving the apartment
complex driveway, and through the windshield, the officer saw that the driver matched the
suspect description. Id. Just as was the case in Wilson, the officer did not pull over the
vehicle for either a suspicious driving pattern or a traffic violation but instead relied upon
an independent witness report of an individual that appeared heavily intoxicated and was
seen driving away in a vehicle. These facts are, again, not applicable to the facts of King’s
case. While again standing for the proposition that an officer needs no driving pattern at all
to pull over a vehicle for suspected DUI, there are no facts in King’s case that the officers
had independent knowledge or facts from a witness that intoxication was suspected in
King. Thus, just as was the case in Wilson, the facts and basis for reasonable suspicion in
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Larson are inapplicable to King’s case.
The state references State v. Brumfield, specifically citing to the language that “a
series of acts that appear innocent, when viewed separately, may warrant further
investigation when viewed together.” (136 Idaho 912, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App.
2001)) (internal quotations removed). It is unclear what “series of acts” that King
committed; the only specific action she is accused of doing that resulted in the officer
pulling her over was leaving her turn signal on through at least two intersections and then
making a legal turn at the third intersection. Brumfield suggests that a series of events,
when taken together, may support reasonable suspicion when one act alone may not. In
this case, the series of events that occurred did not generate more reasonable suspicion
when taken together; in fact, the legal turn made by King dissipated the reasonable
suspicion of the acts when taken together. This suggestion that acts be taken together as a
whole supports the finding that there was no reasonable suspicion of King driving under
the influence in this case.
2) King’s Turn Signal Did Not Violate the Idaho Code Section Governing Turn
Signals
There is no law in the state of Idaho that explicitly forbids an individual driver from
having his or her turn signal on for longer than what is required in order to make a legal
turn. Idaho Code § 49-808 governs signaling, and states, in relevant part:
(1) No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right
or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and
until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving
an appropriate signal.
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall
be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances,
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle
12

before turning.
(3) No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without
first giving an appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle immediately
to the rear when there is opportunity to give such a signal.
(4) The signals required on vehicles by section 49-809, Idaho Code, shall
not be flashed on one (1) side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a
courtesy or "do pass" signal to operators of other vehicles approaching from
the rear, nor be flashed on one (1) side only of a parked vehicle except as
may be necessary for compliance with this section
I.C. § 49-808 (emphasis added). While the statute requires a turn signal to be on for a
certain period of time prior to turning, it does not forbid nor make any comment as to the
legality of having a turn signal on for greater than five seconds or 100 feet. There is also
no mention in the statute or any other statute that undersigned counsel could find that
having a turn signal on but not performing the signaled turn was illegal in nature or a traffic
offense in any way.
This statute proscribes a minimum, but no maximum. No statute seems to explicitly
place a maximum on the amount of time a signal can be on. If the only statute that makes
such behavior illegal is the inattentive driving statute, then a person would have no way of
knowing how long their signal had to be on to be in violation of the law.
The statute also makes clear that giving the appropriate signal is a matter of public
safety. A person is not to turn without a signal, change lanes without a signal, decrease
speed without a signal, not have their signal on for less than 5 seconds, and not have their
signal on for less than 100 feet. If safety is the primary purpose behind the statute, then
providing adequate warning for the safety of other drivers should trump any other concern.
King’s behavior of having the turn signal on for longer than was necessary provides greater
warning to those around her of a potential upcoming turn.
King did not violate I.C. § 49-808, and committed no other traffic infraction
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through her driving on the night in question.
3) There Was Not Sufficient Reasonable Suspicion to Believe King Violated I.C.
49-1401(3), Inattentive Driving
King’s driving pattern did not meet the minimal standards for reasonable suspicion
of inattentive driving. The inattentive driving charge under Idaho Code is explicitly a lesser
included of reckless driving, and both charges are contained in I.C. 49-1401. Reckless
driving requires both that a person drive “carelessly and heedlessly or without due caution
and circumspection” and also that they drive “at a speed or in a manner as to endanger or
be likely to endanger any person or property, or who passes when there is a line in his lane
indicating a sight distance restriction.” Id. Inattentive driving applies either in cases where
“conduct of the operator has been inattentive, careless or imprudent in light of the
circumstances then existing, rather than heedless or wanton, or in those cases where the
danger to persons or property by the motor vehicle operator’s conduct is slight.”
King’s conduct could hardly been deemed to be careless or imprudent. Leaving a
turn signal on through at least two intersections does not create a danger for individuals. In
fact, a turn signal being on puts other drivers on notice of a potential turn, as is the purpose
of the code section governing turn signals. Thus, King’s behavior could be more properly
construed to be careful and prudent driving, or is at least as likely to be careful driving as
it is to be careless driving. In this case she went through at least two intersections and then
made a legal turn at the third intersection. The legal turn bolsters the argument that she was
being careful, not careless, in her driving, and was simply putting other drivers on notice
of her turn. As there were no other vehicles on the road mentioned in testimony, it appears
any potential danger caused by the turn signal is zero as there were no other individuals on
the road who could be endangered by her driving.
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King’s driving did not meet the standard for any known infraction (punishable by
a fine only) in the State of Idaho, and the state has not contended that it did. Yet the state
argues that somehow the turn signal being on through at least two intersections somehow
constitutes a misdemeanor offense, punishable by both jail and fine.
The State relies upon the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Deen v. State to argue
King’s driving was inattentive. 131 Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998). The State’s
reliance is misplaced. In that case, Deen was stopped after an officer observed her activate
her right-hand turn signal and then fail to make the indicated right-hand turn at three
consecutive intersections. The Idaho Supreme Court noted that “the reasonableness of the
suspicion must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances at the time of the
stop, id., including the time of the seizure.” Id. (citing State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930,
932-33, 829 P.2d 520, 522-23 (1992)). Further, the Court of Appeals has previously ruled
that “the suspicion for the stop must be based upon objective information available to the
officer when he decided to make the stop….” Emory, 119 Idaho at 664, 809 P.2d at 525
(Ct.App. 1991).
In citing Deen, the state contends that driving through multiple intersections
signaling an intent to turn but not turning is automatically reasonable suspicion. However,
the test for reasonable articulable suspicion is fact specific and based on the totality of the
circumstances in each case, and thus the Court must look at the specific facts of each case
to determine if there was reasonable suspicion.
In reviewing some of those specific facts for King’s stop, the case is clearly
distinguishable from Deen in two important ways. First, the number of intersections the
defendant passed through with her turn signal on in Deen was found to be three, whereas
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in the instant case, the trial court found that King had her turn signal on “through at least
two intersections and then turned on the third intersection.” (Tr. p.20, L. 20 – p.21, L. 19).
While one intersection difference may seem like a weak distinction, the reality is that the
legitimacy of traffic stops often turns on minor distinctions. In State v. Neal, the Supreme
Court found that simply touching the fog line a few times was not sufficient to warrant a
traffic stop. 159 Idaho 439, 443 (2015). The Court at the same time made the distinction
that crossing the lane line separating lanes of traffic would be sufficient to warrant a stop.
Id. at 446-447. Thus, the difference between a valid and invalid stop may only be which
side of the roadway the vehicle is drifting towards. Similarly, the distinction of potentially
one less intersection that the vehicle passed through with its turn signal on shows lesser
support for the proposition that the driver was driving inattentively; the driver has
necessarily shown less evidence of careless or imprudent driving by having the signal on
for fewer intersections at the time of the stop. The officer thus has less information
available to him at the time from which to base his decision to stop the vehicle.
Second, and just as important, is that King made a legal turn in the direction her
blinker was signaling. When a legal turn is added to the facts, it changes the reasonable
suspicion calculus for the prior driving pattern. It shows that the signal was simply early in
time (not otherwise specifically illegal under any Idaho traffic law as previously stated)
and was followed by a completed turn. In State v. Anderson, the Idaho Supreme Court
recognized the concept of reasonable suspicion dissipating:
If probable cause is established at an early stage of the investigation, it may be
dissipated if the investigating officer later learns additional information that
decreases the likelihood that the defendant has engaged, or is engaging, in criminal
activity
154 Idaho 703, 707, 302 P.3d 328, 332 (2012) (quoting United States v. Ortiz Hernandez,
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427 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2005)). The decision in United States v. Ortiz Hernandez expands
on the idea even further: “As a corollary…of the rule that police may rely on the totality of
the facts available to them in establishing probable cause, they also may not disregard facts
tending to dissipate probable cause.” 427 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2005). The suspicion of
criminal behavior based on the fact that the turn signal was on without a legal turn being
made was erased when King completed her signaled turn at the third intersection. Such an
early turn signal falls into the pattern of ordinary driving behavior, and any reasonable
suspicion dissipated when the legal turn was made.
B.

Article 1 § 17 of the Idaho Constitution

The Idaho Constitution, Article 1, § 17, Unreasonable Search and Seizure, contains
almost identical language to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
The Court has, at times, extended protections beyond that granted by the United
States Constitution, including finding that the “pen register” devices being placed on
telephones constituted a search under Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. State v.
Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748-51, 760 P.2d 1162, 1164-67 (1988) (declined to extend by
State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 20 P.3d 5 (2000); declined to extend by State v. Mubita,
145 Idaho 925, 188 P.3d 867 (2008); distinguished by State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 90 P.3d
306 (2004)).
1) There Was Not Sufficient Reasonable Suspicion Under the Idaho Constitution
to Stop King for DUI or Inattentive Driving
In State v. Henderson, the Idaho Supreme Court highlighted that individual liberty
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is “[p]erhaps the most important attribute of our way of life in Idaho.” 114 Idaho 293, 298,
756 P.2d 1057, 1062 (1988) (distinguished by State v. Thurman, 134 Idaho 90, 996 P.2d
309 (Ct. App. 1999)). The Court in that case found that roadblocks established to apprehend
drunk drivers cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny without express legislative
authority, particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and prior judicial approval. Id.
at 299. In its reasoning, the Court stated that “[t]he Idaho Constitution can, where
appropriate, grant more protection than its federal counterpart.” Id. Henderson
demonstrates that the Idaho Constitution specifically provides a greater protection and that
protection stems from the requirement of particularized suspicion. There is no
particularized suspicion in a situation where everyone driving on a street is stopped by a
DUI roadblock. Lathrop had no particularized suspicion of DUI when he stopped King. He
was unable to relate her specific behavior to a greater suspicion of her committing a DUI
(or something).
For much the same reasons, there was insufficient reasonable suspicion of
Inattentive Driving under I.C. 49-1401(3) by King. The same greater standard under Article
1 § 17 for reasonable, articulable suspicion means that Lathrop’s basis for stopping King
was not sufficient to show why she should be subject to a seizure for violating the
Inattentive Driving statute.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The Defendant respectfully requests this Court affirm the decision of the district court
reversing the decision of the magistrate.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 9th day of November, 2016.

Jonathan McCabe, Deputy Public Defender
Attorney for the Jessica King
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